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ABSTRACT: SEE marked the twentieth century because of 
the numerous crises and conflicts that permanently marked 
regional, European and world history. In order to understand 
processes in SEE, in order to protect their own national 
interests, with the aim of taking control over those processes 
in the area, many countries have sent members of their own 
intelligence and security agencies that operate in the SEE. 
During the aggression against Croatia and occupation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian and Serbian intelligence 
agencies were active in SEE, but with the different positions 
and in the different roles. Some partner agencies tried to 
mediate between the two intelligence communities in order to 
establish contacts and start conversations. However, only the 
liberation of Croatian and B&H area by military means, 
changed the attitude of Serbia, and led to the establishment of 
contacts of national intelligence community. 
KEYWORDS: intelligence, Southeastern Europe, Croatia, 
Homeland war, international intelligence cooperation 
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Sometimes it is difficult to objectively observe and describe 
events such as wars in SEE that dramatically marked the end of 
the twentieth century. Especially when the author(s) were a direct 
participant in some of those events. Direct and objective 
evidence-based facts are the foundation on which future 
generations should learn, to prevent repeating the mistakes of the 
past. Our generation was forced to live history day-by-day. We 
did not have a time to learn and practice. In times of crisis and 
armed conflict, mistakes can be very expensive. In this paper, we 
are presenting a brief overview of the process that marked the 
SEE region for many years. This process, the creation of nation-
states, Western Europe has experienced before. The state of 
unfinished and unsettled peace, unresolved national issues and 
territorial claims of individual policies, (i)direct involvement of 
various national policies led by different national interests, led to a 
crisis and wars that marked the twentieth century. In this paper, 
for the first time in public, we describe, to the extent that it can be 
written, the process of establishing contacts between Croatian 
and Serbian intelligence community. Croatia already in 1994 
accepted the offer of partner intelligence agency to be a mediator 
in a process of establishing contacts between Croatian and the 
Serbian side. However, it took more than 12 months for Serbian 
side to accept this initiative. These meetings were another 
indication of decreasing the tensions and necessity to solve 
problems and disputes by negotiation rather than weapons. We 
are convinced that this is the lesson that future generations need, 
and have, to learn. Just as it is necessary for states in the south 
of Europe to invest additional efforts in order to integrate into the 
EU and become guarantors of regional and supra-regional 
stability.  
Balkanization 
During the last few centuries, SEE was the scene of conflict 
between many international factors and imperial policies led by 
various national, political, ethnic, and economic and security 
interests. These conflicts were, very often, in a function of gaining 
the dominance in other geographical areas. For the purposes of 
this study, we divided conflicts in two main groups according to 
the priority interests of the actors involved: 
• The primary conflicts in which entities from the SEE are 
involved and 
• Secondary conflicts in which entities outside of SEE are, 
in some way, involved; those entities treat the SEE as an 
















































? this region they are trying to achieve a significant advantage in another geographical/political area, better to 
say, the political dominance in the international 
community. 
History of SEE is a history of numerous armed conflicts that 
caused significant boundary changes, and as a consequence 
population migration. When we talk about migration, we do not 
refer exclusively to the spatial migration. We are talking about 
population mobility in the political and religious affiliations that 
become the basis of some future conflicts. 
Because of the frequent changes of political situation in SEE, the 
political dictionary got a new term: Balkanization. According to 
Encyclopedia Britannica3, the term Balkanization refers to:  
‘Division of a multinational state into smaller 
ethnically homogeneous entities. The term is also 
used to refer to ethnic conflict within multiethnic 
states. It was coined at the end of World War I to 
describe the ethnic and political fragmentation that 
followed the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, 
particularly in the Balkans.’ 
States from SEE arose and fell, and some of them have even 
disappeared from the European and world political stage. The 
aggressors with their imperial politics, in most cases, tried to 
assimilate conquered nations from SEE. However, conquered 
nations successfully, mostly through armed conflicts, returned to 
the political scene restoring their national (and any other) identity 
and their statehood. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the SEE region was 
dominated by the Austrian and the Ottoman Empire. Unresolved 
national issues in these political formations, along with other 
internal and external causes, resulted with conflicts and wars that 
led to their degradation, the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth 
century, and Austria-Hungary in the early twentieth century. The 
nations that have been occupied for centuries, returned to the 
political scene. However, in this geo-strategically important area, 
interests of other politically, militarily and economically more 
powerful factors, did not disappear. They wanted to preserve the 
control and supervision over the situation in SEE. Moreover, their 
influence and their way of dealing with the problems, led to some 
political solutions that proved as temporary, and that led to new 
conflicts. 
In times of conflict, the need to collect and process data and 
information intensifies. Each involved side was trying to learn as 
                     
3 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. ‘Balkanization”, written by Robert W. Pringle, 





































much as possible about the opponent and his intentions. It was 
the nineteenth century when the process of making the 
foundation for future Intelligence and Security Community (ISC) in 
some countries in the SEE region started4. 
In the twentieth century, SEE experienced intense activity of three 
totalitarian systems: Nazism, Fascism and Communism. One of 
their common, maybe the key, feature was the organization of a 
strong and repressive ISC in order to achieve complete control of 
the mind and the soul of affected populations. That resulted in the 
restraint of the democratization of the international order. 
Nonetheless, nineteenth and twentieth century were centuries of 
European and global integration (integration on internal and 
making colonies on international level) that occurred 
simultaneously with the dissolution of great empires and the 
creation of a growing number of states on the territory of SEE: ‘... 
During the time of the industrial revolution and the increasing 
degree of cultural and technical integration of Europe (and the 
world), number of independent states in Europe in 1871 
constantly increased. After the unification of Germany and Italy, 
there were only 14 states, 20 in 1914, and 26 in 1924. After the 
Second World War that number climbed to 33‘5. 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia 
After the Second World War, the situation in SEE looked like it 
calmed. In this area, as the only one in Europe, states of all three 
main political blocs had mutual borders: NATO, Warsaw Pact 
(WP) and Non-aligned movement. In the central part of the SEE 
was Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY or 
Yugoslavia), a multiethnic country with communist totalitarian 
regime on power. Communist rulers (Tito, Hoxha, Causescu, 
Zivkov, Kadar) created their own, modeled on the Soviet Cheka, 
ISC carrying out terror against people that tried to support free 
and democratic elections together with the freedom of speech. 
Imposing communist ideology as a basis for building a society 
and the state, communists did not hesitate to organize mass 
arrests, torture, imprisonment and even liquidation of their political 
opponents in the country and abroad. History has shown us that 
the communist regimes, to which repression against their own 
citizens is/was a normal behaviour, cannot successfully held on 
power. The only question is the way how those systems will fail. 
Or peacefully or during the armed conflict. 
                     
4 Cmelić, Milan: Austrijska obaveštajna služba prema Srbiji za vreme prvog ustanka; 
Istorijska gradja – Knjiga II, Državni sekretarijat za poslove narodne odbrane - 
Uprava službe bezbednosti, Beograd, 1959. 
5 Franjo Tuđman: ‘Nacionalno pitanje u suvremenoj Europi’, München – Barcelona : 
Knjižnica Hrvatske revije,1981., page 238. Today EU has a 28 member states. 
















































? The disintegration of Yugoslavia was, unlike some other multi-ethnic communist states (Czechoslovakia, USSR) marked by 
armed conflicts. This process briefly may be described as a 




• aggression against Croatia, 
• occupation of B&H, 
• Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 
• Montenegro, 
• Kosovo. 
Due to the crisis development and the threat of contagion of the 
crisis beyond its borders, Yugoslavia became a particularly 
important area of interest to Intelligence and Security (IS) 
agencies, both from the West and those from the East of Europe. 
However, since the east European states (mostly members of 
WP) in the 1990s went through their internal catharsis caused by 
the collapse of WP, their activities, in and against the Yugoslavia, 
were significantly smaller than the Western impact (excluding the 
Soviet Union) to the events in the former Yugoslavia. Since the 
crisis in Yugoslavia threatened regional and European stability 
and security, many countries were seeking answers about the 
causes of such a crisis, its development and consequences 
towards immediate and wider neighbourhood, and the ways how 
they can protect, or expand, their national interests. In the 
process of fulfilling those tasks, IS agencies were involved. 
It is normal to raise a question whether the IS agencies, were 
able to correctly assess future developments, brutal 
disintegration, of Yugoslavia. According to available documents6, 
and conversations with witnesses (relevant persons form leading 
NATO member IS agencies) from that time, it is possible to 
assume that the IS agencies, in their short-term and long-term 
analyzes, accurately predicted inevitable disintegration of 
Yugoslavia. However, driven by different political interests in 
accordance with different strategies and visions of a new 
international order, the political elite of the majority of member 
states of the then European Community and NATO, have not 
adopted such reports as a necessity. They, almost to the end of 
                     
6 Special National Intelligence Estimate: Yugoslavia: An Approaching crisis?, January 
1983., 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_000
0273239.pdf; (accessed June 10, 2013), NIE 12-90: The Future of Eastern 
Europe, April 1990,; 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_000
0265644.pdf, (accessed June 10, 2013), NIE 15-90: Yugoslavia Transformed, 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DO  




































the 1991, and some even later, supported the survival of 
Yugoslavian existence7. Therefore IS agencies cannot be held 
responsible for wrong decisions of the politicians nor the IS 
agencies should take actions to prove that they were right, and 
that the political elite failed. In the current democratic systems, 
legally and legitimately elected government is responsible for 
mistakes in managing the state. Only voters in elections or some 
state institutions in accordance with applicable constitutional and 
statutory provisions (e.g. the Constitutional Court) can decide, in 
those cases, about the future of political elite in power. 
Some governments admitted, in the middle and at the end of 
1991 (often due to the public pressure), that Croatia was exposed 
to the brutal aggression. Croatia accepted all the conditions from 
the international community in which Croatia confirmed the 
expressed intention that it wants to be a responsible member of 
the international community. Support to the process of preserving 
Yugoslavia was withdrawn. The process of international 
recognition of those republics of former Yugoslavia that wished to 
be an independent state, started. It was the process, which was 
years before announced by some key IS agencies of NATO 
member countries. 
New Croatian administration 
The new democratically elected Government of Croatia came to 
power in mid 1990s. Government found a number of problems 
that were hampering effective seizure of power and the 
organization of society and state in accordance with the new, 
democratic, principles. Croatia, as a part of Yugoslavia, had a 
very limited right to organize their own defence system. Expecting 
a loss of power in Croatia, federal and republican communist 
(civilian and military) authorities took some actions immediately 
before and after the election that prevented effective defence 
organization. Justice, security and police system, like most other 
institutions on the republic level8, were strongly influenced by the 
                     
7    Paradigmatic example was behaviour of Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S.  
 ambassador to Yugoslavia, based in Belgrade from 1989 to 1992. His  
 memories toward the disintegration of Yugoslavia began with: ‘This is the  
 story of villains - the bastards who are to blame for the destruction of  
 multiethnic Yugoslavia ... ‘ (Warren Zimmerman, ‘The Sources of a  
 disaster’, New York: Harper, 1997, page 11). Zimmerman stands by his  
 convictions despite the fact that CIA estimates about the disintegration of  
 Yugoslavia were made before the first democratic and multi-party  
 elections in Yugoslavia, before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Zimmerman was  
 familiar with those CIA reports. Zimmerman said that he invested all of his  
 efforts that such estimates cannot be realised. 
8 Republic of Croatia was one of the eight (six republics and two  
 autonomous provinces) components of SFRY that has (according  
 to Constitution) equal (political) rights. Their institutions had an  
















































? Communist Party, which, after 45 years, in elections in April 1990 lost power. International political contacts of a new Government 
were week. For 45 years Communist party was building a 
personnel system mainly based on party loyalty of employees, not 
on their expertise and professionalism. Therefore the new 
government found exclusively communist cadre in all institutions. 
Croatia was threatened by the external (Yugoslav People's Army 
(YPA), Serbia and Montenegro) and internal aggression (rebel 
Serbs and the Yugoslavs within Croatia). Croatian government 
had only jurisdiction over the republic’s State Security Service 
(SSS)9, civilian counter-intelligence agency (which was, almost 
completely, filled by the Communist party loyal cadres). Croatian 
leadership decided to start a process of creating an effective 
defence system started by setting short- and long-term goals 
(from the new Constitutional and legal foundations of a new 
democratic system, international recognition, the reintegration of 
all occupied territories to the process of stabilization of the whole 
region). 
Immediately after taking power in late May 1990, the issue of 
lustration was one of the questions that marked that time, just as 
it is today. However, the policy of reconciliation and unity in 
defence of the democratic constitutional order, national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity for the benefit of all its citizens, 
postponed implementation of lustration for some other time. In the 
case of the implementation of the lustration immediately after 
taking power in May 1990, with absolute certainty we can say that 
Government would found themselves in a situation known in 
medicine: The operation was a success, but the patient died. In 
the event that the lustration conducted immediately after 
elections, administrative system would have collapsed, there 
would be strong internal divisions, and government would not be 
able to function effectively. Defence against forthcoming 
aggression could not be possible. Those forces (combined by the 
Federal and Serbian institutions), which later led an attack against 
the new government will be able, by use of violent methods, to 
successfully overthrown Croatian government. At the end, the 
lustrated persons would lustrate those who started lustration. 
Croatia would remain a part of new Yugoslavia (without Slovenia) 
but under the political leadership of Slobodan Milošević and other 
creators of Greater Serbian politics. 
Each process begins and ends with people, with those who have 
the vision, can make plans, manage and control individual 
                                                        
 different in a case of the federal institutions that were able to act 
. on territory of SFRY. 
9 State Security Service of the Republic Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Socialist 




































processes at macro and micro levels. As an illustration of the 
existing personnel in key positions in the military and security 
systems, some statistical data are listed. National structure of the 
YPA officer corps in 1990, in relation to the national composition 
of Yugoslavia by the census is shown in Table 110. 
For the non-Serbs more disturbing was ethnic composition 
statistic of employees in Croatian SSS at the end of 1990 as 
shown in Table 2. At the key management positions, particularly 
in the regional headquarters, were the persons that come to those 
positions mostly from the highest regional communist party and 
government bodies. 
Organizing new ISC in Croatia 
Since the organization of the new ISC was one of the important 
segments of organizing an effective defence, the new Croatian 
government set very clear goals and objectives that lead to the 
construction of a new, democratic and efficient ISC: 
• The preservation of the constitutional order, territorial 
integrity and security for all citizens, 
• Democratization and de-politicization (de-communisation) 
of previous security system, 
• Support for regional stability, 
• The fight against terrorism and organized crime (OC) and 
• Assistance and protection of members of international 
forces engaged in missions in SEE countries. 
Unlike Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia have fundamentally changed 
the approach to structuring their own ISC with respect to 
methodology, applied resources and their goals and objectives. 
The application of ISC violence, especially against those who 
think differently, who criticize the Party in power, was abandoned 
and strictly forbidden. The newly adopted Constitution guaranteed 
the full freedom of thought and expression to every person. 
Spoken and written words treated as verbal offences. Totalitarian 
communist system convicted tens of thousands of people. Verbal 
offence act was one of the key subjects of communist ISS and it 
was abolished immediately after new government takes power. 
The rights to have a different opinion become one of the 
fundamental human rights. 
The process of creation of a new Croatian ISC, in accordance 
with the new aims and objectives, was based on new principles:  
                     
10 According to: Domazet-Lošo, D., Hrvatska i veliko ratište, Udruga sv. Jurja, Zagreb, 
















































? • Loyalty to the Constitution and the constitutional order, democracy, patriotism, 
• Organization of ISC (even during the immediate state of 
war and threaten to the existence of the State) in 
accordance with the principles of similar systems in 
NATO member countries (primarily U.S.) and Israel, 
• A clear division of responsibilities between civilian and 
military intelligence and security agencies, 
• The organization of an effective institutional system of 
control and supervision over the legality of the  ISC work, 
• IS agencies were no longer allowed to act as instruments 
of political violence. 
IS agencies ceased to participate actively in the conduct of policy, 
they were no longer the ‘sword and shield in the hands of the 
Party’11. Symbiosis between the Party and the IS agencies from 
communist totalitarian time (when, lower level Party officials were 
employees/agents of the IS agencies, while at higher levels of 
decision-making process, Agencies were guided by the Party's 
central bodies) was cut. Based on new principles and standards 
of democratic societies, initial process of transformation from 
communist to a new Croatian ISC was finished at the end of 
1993, beginning of 1994.  
Activities of different IS agencies in SEE 
SEE region during the time of crisis in the former Yugoslavia, 
drew direct attention of a large number of IS agencies. In 
accordance with there own national interests, many members of 
various national ISS flooded SEE: 
• States from SEE, 
• States that considered the region of SEE as a part of 
there own national interests, 
• States that were not directly present in the SEE region 
but, incited by the existing processes in the region, tried 
to realize there national interests, 
• States that had their representatives in various military 
and civilian international peacekeeping missions in SEE. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) was of particular interest to a 
number of ISC (mentioned bellow) for different reasons (for 
example, in a relatively small area, members of many ethnic and 
religious communities lived together, therefore this area could 
                     
11 This was a phrase that was interpreted a mission of ISC in Communist Yugoslavia, as 
well as in other communist countries (eg. GDR) where the ISC was created on the 




































serve as a testing field of the effectiveness of different information 
and media strategies and operations). Many states directed 
activities of their ISC, in accordance with their needs, toward and 
in the B&H: 
• Neighbouring states (Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro), 
• States that had taken responsibilities over the some parts 
of B&H according with the Dayton division into three 
zones (British, American, French), 
• States that had had their representatives in national and 
international organizations in B&H and in SEE, and which 
acted toward B&H, 
• States of Islamic origin that wanted to gain advantage 
over the Muslims from B&H on there side (Turkey, Iran, 
Saudi Arabia). 
Conflict between Shiite and Sunni policies in B&H is still visible. 
Sunni journal published in B&H, SAFF, recently accused two 
Iranian diplomats that were expelled from B&H that their only 
task, as ‘members of Iranian intelligence’ was ‘spreading Schism 
and promoting Iranian culture.’12 The same accusation expands to 
all Iranian diplomats in B&H because, according to SAFF, ‘the 
only Iranian diplomatic mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to 
spread Schism.’ Unknown author ends with the following words13 
‘Unfortunately Shiite spies have managed to build a solid network 
of collaborators among Bosniaks. Consequences of their actions 
all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina will felt’.14 
. 
Establishing a new Croatian ISC and some child 
diseases 
During the Croatian Homeland war, Croatia successfully carried 
out the transformation of the inherited ISC constructed on the 
foundations of the communist regime. New ISC was built 
according the standards of multi-party democracy in 
contemporary Europe. New ISC was apolitical, professionalized 
with new staff matured in the war. New agencies, with clear goals 
and tasks, responsibilities and authorities, were recognized and 
accepted in the international professional community as equal 
partners. As an illustration, we can mention the fact that the 
Croatian Intelligence Agency (HIS), civilian foreign intelligence 
service, in the late 1999 had partner relations with twice as many 
foreign agencies than the Yugoslav Federal State Security 
                     
12 ‘Jedini zadatak iranskih špijuna u BiH je širenje šiizma’, SAFF, number 340 from 17 
May 2013 (7 redžeb 1434), front page and unsigned text on page 10. 
13 Ibid, page 10. 
















































? Service (SDB) managed to establish during their 45 years of existence.15 
However, during the process of creating a new ISC, some 
problems that became serious challenges to the leadership, 
occurred. Perfect system does not exist. There is no system, no 
matter how well it is organized, that individuals cannot 
compromise. Likewise, high-quality individuals who find 
themselves at the right time in the right place can badly organized 
system transfer into good and effective system without 
compromising human rights. 
Croatian ISC suffered from certain childhood diseases. However, 
the system had the power to solve majority of them using their 
internal forces. Those situations, together with agencies 
experiences, leadership used to learn and to change what was 
necessary to change. However, the challenges for the ISC came 
from outside, by some opposition politicians who attempted to 
discredit ISC, blaming at that time the Government. Those 
attempts to discredit the ISC and the Government were in 
accordance with the interests of certain international (national, 
multinational, private) entities16. It was hard for ISC to provide an 
effective response, especially during the time of Croatian 
Homeland war. It is legitimate to ask why the Croatian ISC, 
although it recognized the threat (planners and implementers) did 
not prevent their negative effects. The answer is simple: because 
the new ISC was apolitical, and it ceased to be a political police 
with executive and judicial powers like it had during communist 
governments. The ISC was not above the politics and politicians, 
the ISC did not affect the conduct of politics like the one during 
the communist regime. 
Despite all the challenges it faced, after the military operations 
and the peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories in the 
beginning of 1998, Croatian ISC successfully began process of 
transformation from war- to a peacetime ISC. Priorities were 
changed. In the period of transformation, the system successfully 
maintained a high level of professionalism in their activities, 
including those connected with protection of interests and safety 
and security of members of the international, civil and military, 
forces in their missions in SEE. Croatian ISC conducted a number 
                     
15 M. Tuđman, ‘The first five years of the Croatian Intelligence Service: 1993-1998”, 
National Security and Future, Vol. 1, No. 2., (June 2000)   
http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=28775, (accessed 
June 10, 2013). 
16 An illustrative example is the text ‘Croatia’s Intelligence Services’ (Jane's Intelligence 
Review, September 1994, pp. 404-409 ), author Marko Milivojevic, member of the 
Research Unit in South Eastern Studies at the University of Bradford. The 
presentation was not made on facts. It was based on theses of Greater Serbian 
propaganda: the Croatian ISC was made in alliance and under the control of 
Germany, by analogy cooperation between Nazi and Ustasha regime during the 




































of joint operations with key NATO member states, especially in 
the second half of the 1990s. NATO was particularly interested in 
the protection of Stabilization force (SFOR) (previously 
Implementation forces - IFOR) units in their missions in B&H. 
Several joint operations (Croatia-NATO member countries) were 
running during five-year cooperation period (1994-1999) aiming to 
collect necessity information for the protection of SFOR/IFOR 
troops. At the end of 1999, it was confirmed by some of the 
highest NATO military officials that during that period, more than 
60% of all the useful information that arrived at NATO 
headquarters in Brussels, or to the SFOR Headquarter in B&H, 
were obtained through the cooperation with the Croatian ISC. 
Regional ISC cooperation 
One of responsibilities of Croatian ISC was to act in a sense to 
prevent escalation of military activities by aggressors, to stabilize 
the situation and to stop the wars in the SEE region. In this sense, 
leadership of Croatian ISC accepted, in 1994, offer of an 
influential partner agency to be a mediator to establish a contact 
with the Serbian State security department (RDB).  
Croatian leadership accepted this offer because: 
• Attempt to establish contact with the Serbian side was 
supposed to lead to a gradual improvement in relations 
between the Croatia and Serbia, 
• To show that Croatia considered Serbia responsible for 
the aggression against Croatia, and that ending the war 
and resolving the crisis peacefully and quietly, stabilizing 
situation in B&H, and peaceful reintegration of occupied 
parts of Croatia was the priority of all priorities for the 
Croatian ISC, 
• To show that Croatia had a policy that seeks 
reconciliation and coexistence17. 
However, although the Croatian side accepted the proposal, 
Belgrade (then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) showed no 
interest in establishing a relationship between two ISC’s. 
Belgrade, obviously, counted on the military, rather than political, 
solution in Croatia and B&H. After the Croatian armed forces 
operations, ran together with the Croatian ISC during 1995, after 
                     
17 At the meeting of the heads of Croatian and partner agencies, which had a major 
impact on the Serbian RDB, Croatian side was asked about possibility to establish 
contacts with Serbian side. Partner agency had their interests to come to the 
cooperation between the Croatian and Yugoslav/Serbian authorities. Croatian side 
warned that Croatia is interested in establishing cooperation, noting that this 
cooperation will not come because Belgrade is not interested in a political solution 
of the conflict. Our estimate found to be true. It contributed to the reputation of the 
Croatian authorities, but this did not help in finding a political solution for occupied 
















































? the signing of the Dayton Agreement and after the signing of the Agreement about normalization of relations and mutual 
recognition between Croatia and   Yugoslavia, relations between 
their IS agencies began. 
Concrete cooperation between the two ISC’s was not able even 
after the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube region at 
the beginning of 1998. Especially in the area of the common 
struggle against OC. Croatian ISC was fully reorganized in 
accordance with the new democratic principles, while the Serbian 
ISC almost completely retained the structure, personnel, and 
methods and tools that they had at the time of communist regime. 
Serbian ISC went through some changes during 2000, and 
especially after the assassination (in 2003) of at that time Serbian 
Prime Minister Djindjic. Those changes opened the possibility of 
establishing better cooperation of two ICS’s in different fields in 
accordance with the common national, and international, 
interests. 
In B&H, during the 1990s, three parallel IS structures were 
created by three entities: Bosnians, Croatians and Serbians. 
Croatian ISC established a partnership with the IS agency of 
Croatians from B&H. During the 1990s, there were no attempts to 
establish a relationship with the IS agency of Bosnian Serbians. 
Bosniak (Muslims from B&H) side did not have an interest to 
establish relations with the Croatian ISC before Washington 
agreements (signed in March 1994). This Agreement created the 
preconditions for the establishment of relations between 
Investigation and Documentation Agency (AID), intelligence and 
security service controlled by B&H Muslims) and Croatian 
intelligence agency. At that time head of AID, Nedzad Ugljen, 
came to Zagreb, Croatia, with a proposal to establish cooperation 
with the Croatian intelligence agency. Croatian leadership 
approved that cooperation, only if it will be in accordance with the 
signed Washington agreements. It seemed that Nedzad Ugljen 
was genuinely interested in the cooperation between the 
agencies based on those agreements. Unfortunately, Ugljen was 
killed in 1996, in the inter-Bosniaks political conflicts. Cooperation 
between Croatian intelligence agency and AID, until the end 
1990’s, remained in the shadow of political murders that have 
rocked the AID and tore the relationships in the Bosniak 
intelligence and political conflicts. 
After the change of government in Croatia's parliamentary 
elections held in January 2000, new government launched a new 
process of reorganization of Croatian ISC. This process took 
several years. It was aimed to abolish ISC model, which was 
established in 1990s. However, the implemented changes did not 
lead to any further system efficiency. They resulted in the 
reduction of intelligence activities abroad to a minimum. After 




































intelligence activity (dealing with the internal problems of 
organized crime and corruption). 
Conclusion 
Unfinished wars and unstable peace were the main 
characteristics of the SEE unstable areas in the last two 
centuries. Conflicts in this area were, very often, in a function of 
the conflicts of different imperial policies and international actors 
in order to create global domination or additional benefits in some 
other geographical areas. It is also clear that the reasons or 
excuses of some conflicts were in the existing national myths and 
prejudices that ignore historical facts. Myths and prejudices (such 
as the motto All Serbs has to live in one state, equalization of 
Yugoslav communism with Western democracies, communist 
claims that the question of national issues in multinational 
Yugoslavia were resolved, the position that one of the reasons of 
the wars in Yugoslavia were eternal mutual hatred between 
Croats, Serbs and Muslims) interfere with rational thinking. They 
are disabling the process of learning on mistakes and disabling 
the activities that such mistakes, which can inevitably lead to new 
conflicts and destruction, did not repeat. Albert Einstein once 
said, ‘It is easier to break an atom than a prejudice.’18 
With Croatian entry in EU, part of the SEE remained isolated and 
surrounded by EU member states. The question is what might be 
the future of those states (Serbia, B&H, Montenegro, FYROM, 
Albania and Kosovo). Can the crisis and instability in these states, 
either individually or in some form of integrated action, cause 
large-scale crisis? Could the crisis be the cause of some new 
divisions according to some Russians predicts19: further changes 
of state borders, not only in the SEE region but Europe as a 
whole? 
In the process of stabilization and normalization of the SEE 
region, one of the main roles, individually and in cooperation with 
others, has to have a national ISC’s. They have to become 
serious and reliable partner in international intelligence 
community, as if it was in the case of Croatian ISC. 
Croatian integration into the EU is a clear signal of a direction in 
which other states within SEE need to move if they want to 
prevent the recurrence of unwanted past. Integration is also an 
indication that ‘small’ partners can become important and that real 
                     
18 Quote by Albert Einstein: http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/118236-it-is-harder-to-
crack-prejudice-than-an-atom, (accessed August 28, 2013). But there are some 
sources that express doubts is this really Albert Einstein’s quote or is it just 
attributed to him (Talk: Albert Einstein: 
URL:http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Talk:Albert_Einstein, accessed August 28, 2013) 
19 Политинформация, Россия поменяет Кавказ на Белоруссию и Украину; Карта 
№2 - Центральная Европа; Опубликовано 09 Июля 2012 г., 
















































? and serious cooperation with regional and global partners can lead to successful results. Small ISS can become reliable partner 
in demanding situations. As retired US general Stanley 
McChrystal said in a recent interview: ‘It’s all about teams. 
Nobody wins the war alone’. 20 
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? Table 1. Comparisons of national composition by the census in 
Yugoslavia and national composition in officer’s corps in YPA in 1990 
 
 
Table 2. Comparisons of national composition by the census in Croatia 





AID - Investigation and Documentation Agency 
(intelligence agency of Bosnian Muslims in B&H until the 
1996) 
B&H – Bosnia and Herzegovina 
                     
21 Due to the differences in census in different republics in former SFRY, it is not 
possible to have an exact number of population which said that they are, by the 
nationality, Yugoslavs which was imaginary nationality created by the Communist 
party of Yugoslavia. 
Nationality % in  
census
% in  
YPA
difference 
Serbs 36,3 63,2 + 174 % 
Croats 19,8 12,6 - 64 % 
Montenegrins 2,3 6,2 + 270 % 
Yugoslavs21 ? 3,6 ? 
Slovenians 7,4 2,8 - 38% 
Nationality % in  
census
% in  
SSS
difference 
Croats 78 51 - 65 % 
Serbs 12 29 + 242 % 




































GDR – German Democratic Republic (former East 
Germany) 
HIS - Croatian Intelligence Agency 
IS – Intelligence and security 
ISC - Intelligence and Security Community  
Party (Communist) – Yugoslavian league of communist   
SDB – acronym for both Federal and Serbian State Security 
Service (until 1992) 
SEE - Southeaster Europe 
SSS - State Security Service 
WP - Warsaw Pact 
YPA - Yugoslav People's Army 
 
